Defense Secretary Rumsfeld lays out the prerequisites for an acceptably democratic Iraq in the Wall Street Journal. The crux of his leaders' vision:

Iraqis have an historic opportunity to build a free and civil society. The road ahead will be difficult, but the coalition is committed to helping them succeed. As Iraqis take hold of their country, develop the institutions of self-government, and reclaim their place as responsible members of the international community, the world will have a new model for a successful transition from tyranny to self-reliance - and a new ally in the global war on terror and the struggle for freedom and moderation in the Muslim world.

Although democratization processes - post-World War II and the present - have come under a joint (read: repeatedly contested) jurisdiction between State and Defense, it isn't absurd to consider the value of a department solely dedicated to the establishment of self-government. If America accepts its charge as vanguard of freedom and liberator of all oppressed peoples, such permanence is logical. When a dictator's turn comes, State would play nice, Defense will play for keeps - and a Department of Reconstitution or some such would install a stable, consensual government.

Andrew Sullivan lightens his scorn against the administration with a slight withdrawal, but nevertheless strikes an odd gun-control note, believing that a confiscation of weapons in Iraq would necessarily end the activity of armed louts. Arsenals and arbitrary caches, of course, must not remain bare to acquisition. But as with any disarmament, those most affected will be law-abiding citizens who need guns the most.

Meanwhile, David Frum gives us the words we need, right in line with what I've been pounding home for the better part of a week, knocking out Sullivan's baying like Joe Lewis might smack a stroppy John McEnroe:

I sometimes wish there were a futures market in conventional wisdom. If so, I’d see that the market in Iraq reconstruction pessimism has now topped. (The only reason to think that it might have a little further to go is that R.W. Apple has not yet published his piece on the front page of the New York Times pronouncing the reconstruction doomed.)

Next wave of journalistic reports: The US Army is pretty good at getting the lights back on and fixing things – Iraqis turn out not to be much interested in creating a Shi’ite theocracy like Iran’s – and do, surprise, surprise, show considerable interest in the peace and development message of Ahmed Chalabi and Kanan Makiya.

In the first two years of Japan's Occupation, the people were highly interested in the extremism of active Socialism and Communism. As life slowly began to stabilize, however, their interest in these tickets to slavery exsiccated rather quickly. No one with even a modicum of understanding of bringing a society up from ruins - physical or sociological - should expect major, solid improvements in the countrywide situation until this fall or winter. Considering that, keep your expectations trained on the myriad tiny steps leading up to those triumphs.

Far be it to call Amir Taheri shallow in his knowledge of the Near East and careless in any critical observation he makes. There's a difference between stated intent - "Hell, I don't care if I win this ball game" - and practical reality - "The first and second innings were a little messy; even though we wanted this a shutout we're only down by one." I was more than a little bothered when I heard that Bush was tepid on the vital nature of ensuring Iraq's transition to nothing but democracy (a quote that turns out to be either false or irrelevant, as the White House has been firm and unmistakable in its opposition to Iraqi authoritarians-come-lately). That's quite different than thumbing my nose at every obstacle rearing its ugly head, especially when a success-proven administration has declared its determination.

Jay Garner's problem, as Taheri sees it, was less about the results of his work than the attitude precipitating them:

Jay Garner, the retired general who has just been replaced as the man in charge of building a new Iraq, had a favorite phrase: "I am open to all ideas!" He repeated it each time he talked to Iraqi political and social figures, and in addresses to the Iraqi people.

The general used the phrase as a sign of American goodwill. Little did he know that by doing so he was shooting himself in the foot, politically speaking.

[...]

The most dangerous thing for anyone dealing with the Arabs is to appear clueless, as did Garner. Arabs often impute to a partner or an adversary more than is the case. A partner who is perceived to know less than expected, is abandoned. And an adversary who is exposed as weaker than perceived would find it hard to regain respect let alone inspire awe.

Taheri offers advice for his inauguration Paul Bremer, not presumptious and immediate condemnation:

What should Bremer do?

He must start by telling the Iraqis that the U.S.-led Coalition does have a vision for Iraq. The impression most people have is that the U.S. is like a little boy who has just won a big teddy bear at a fair but does not quite know what to do with his prize.

President George W. Bush has already stated the U.S. vision for Iraq. He says he wants Iraq to become a model of democracy for Arabs, indeed for Muslims.

Bremer must make it clear that the U.S. intends to pursue that vision with the same determination that it conducted the war of liberation.

Taheri goes on - read it. His point is cogent: the results we want will show, troubles notwithstanding, from the right vision. Difficulties can be overcome; that's where I think Sullivan is, for whatever reason, playing politics. But nothing will come about without that vision.

Inexplicable - that's what I'd call Andrew Sullivan's 180-degree turn in his trust of the Bush administration's ability to juggle the torches and knives that is nation-building. Unsure as to whether he realizes he sounds exactly like the cynic-misanthrope leftists he's been impugning for months, I am compelled to debunk his latest truculent missive, "Losing the Peace." Sullivan links arms with a Washington Post story and guffaws at the thought of 145,000 American troops keeping the peace in a supposedly gigantic country.

Two problems with this assessment: one geographical, the other historical. Everyone is familiar with the phrase "A country the size of California." It is really only germane, however, to the topic of sites for weapons caches. Weapons caches can be plunked down in the middle of nowhere; they don't need telephone lines or irrigation, roadways or connections to markets. People do, hence the general limitation of Iraq's population centers to the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.

It's unlikely that Predator drones and other forms of surveillance far more powerful than GIs wandering about will cease to monitor Iraqi borders and frontiers in the near future; so what we have is, in fact, an area much smaller than the whole of Iraq where Allied troops will need to supervise and, if need be, contain foreign or domestic troublemakers.

The second problem with this gloomy survey is that, once again, it ignores history. Japan, though a "tiny" island, is more than four-fifths the size of Iraq and described by the CIA as "Slightly smaller than California." And that's besides the point - it's people one needs to worry about when maintaining country-wide civil order, not landscapes. The Post article echoes this by concentrating on looting and disorderliness on the streets that has continued for a month, caused by people in urban environments that are relatively tiny, population-dense sections of the country.

In 1945, Japan's population was around 60 million - more than two times that of Iraq today, estimated at 25 million. At war's end, Douglas MacArthur had about 700,000 troops under his command but before the Occupation was far along, that number shrunk to 200,000.

Straight numbers, that's roughly 300 Japanese for every GI. In Iraq, the number is close to 172 for every Allied soldier. For two geographically comparable countries, the most recent democratization not only benefits from fifty years of communications, transportation and surveillance technology but actually boasts twice the complement as its successful predecessor.

The first few years of Iraq's struggle to liberty will be difficult, let alone the first few months. Doubt is understandable, though reasonable faith should be the order of the day - the Bush administration has proved its mettle on the countless tiny challenges this campaign has brought. Earlier attempts at combining momentary confusion and apparent setback - like the United Nations balk, the so-called military failure (wasn't "Not enough boots on the ground" the mantra?) and the now-dispelled museum pillage - into irreparable failure have completely disintegrated as groundless charges do. Thus looking at our American leadership, we have a pattern in front of us - and it isn't one acquainted with disaster. That is reserved for the peanut gallery, sadly still gaining members.

Why, Sullivan, why?

I've become less and less impressed with Andrew Sullivan. I've watched in dismay as, over the past couple of weeks, Sullivan has shifted some residual - or growing - resentment of Bush as bracing for a series of critical remarks about post-war Iraq that are as bipolar - Sullivan just spent a year lavishing praise and exclaiming steadfast trust for Bush - as they are transparent and, embarrassingly, based on nothing but whim and headline. I enjoy reading Sullivan and I've been working hard trying to give him some leeway, but emotion is clearly overwhelming any sense of objective judgment in his writing.

To wit: Sullivan added an entry today, Saturday, entitled "The Mess in Iraq." He cites a "devasting" account from a "pro-war writer" and generally predicts, Von Hoffmanesque, disaster.

Now, Jonathan Foreman is certainly pro-war. But either Sullivan hasn't read Foreman lately or else Sullivan doesn't mind if a comparison between two articles Foreman wrote within three weeks of each other betrays unsteady, almost completely contradictory opinions - like those found in Sullivan's articles.

In the May 12 issue of the Weekly Standard, Jonathan Foreman published an article entitled Bad Reporting In Baghdad with the subtitle You Have No Idea How Well Things Are Going. It's been celebrated by the progressive right for the better part of two weeks as an exposé on the smashing success of the Allied occupation and the liberal media's failure to report it. Foreman bubbles giddily:

It's endlessly fascinating to watch the interactions between U.S. patrols and the residents of Baghdad. It's not just the love bombing the troops continue to receive from all classes of Baghdadi--though the intensity of the population's pro-American enthusiasm is astonishing, even to an early believer in the liberation of Iraq, and continues unabated despite delays in restoring power and water to the city. It's things like the reaction of the locals to black troops. They seem to be amazed by their presence in the American army. One group of kids in a poor neighborhood shouted "Mike Tyson, Mike Tyson" at Staff Sergeant Darren Swain; the daughter of a diplomat on the other hand informed him, "One of my maids has the same skin as you."

[...]

[Y]ou won't see much of this on TV or read about it in the papers. To an amazing degree, the Baghdad-based press corps avoids writing about or filming the friendly dealings between U.S. forces here and the local population--most likely because to do so would require them to report the extravagant expressions of gratitude that accompany every such encounter. Instead you read story after story about the supposed fury of Baghdadis at the Americans for allowing the breakdown of law and order in their city.

Well, I've met hundreds of Iraqis as I accompanied army patrols all over the city during the past two weeks and I've never encountered any such fury (even in areas that were formerly controlled by the Marines, who as the premier warrior force were never expected to carry out peacekeeping or policing functions). There is understandable frustration about the continuing failure of the Americans to get the water supply and the electricity turned back on, though the ubiquity of generators indicates that the latter was always a problem. And there are appeals for more protection (difficult to provide with only 12,000 troops in a city of 6 million that has not been placed under strict martial law). But there is no fury.

Foreman, to his credit, calls this a "honeymoon" and wisely cautions that things could go "horribly wrong." But from yesterday's New York Post article, Foreman is almost as uncontrollable in his despair and distaste for the American governmental administration of reconstruction, a historically difficult and slow-moving task.

For Sullivan, Foreman's four-AM-phone-call-diatribe piece is enough to bitterly talk of "affairs [spiraling] out of control." But this is the best Foreman can come up with:

1. Restoring electricity is slow in Baghdad - while monstrously successful in Basra, where more "have power than ever before." Interesting: Basra is much smaller than Baghdad; the latter was also the seat of the Ba'athist regime and therefore much more likely to contain gangs of recalcitrants or guerillas.

2. Miscommunications are frequent between the Americans and the Iraqis.

a. Allied troops are not, apparently, able to fire on looters.

b. Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Aid accidentally stuck the Ba'athist star on its first broadcast.

c. Sergeant Leon Peters, presumably of Foreman's unit, is awfully worried that yellow humanitarian packages are slow to arrive; after all, it's been more than thirty days on his account.

d. ORHA is light-handed with reconstruction, particularly electricity, relying on local engineers for much of the work. It appears months and months of America being derided as an imperialist power did make an impact, and the Allies are loathe to tell the Iraqis what to do or how to do it. Amazingly, the Iraqis could care less. But the damage is done. Does the "world community" not understand that it reaps what it sows?

e. Civil Affairs is poor on keeping appointments with Iraqi representatives, citizens who are probably quite used to the prompt attention they received from the Ba'ath Party. Ba'athists must have been polite, punctual and would know perfectly well who they were dealing with (and what they looked like, and how many televisions they had, and who their friends were, and what torture would be the most psychologically effective, etc.).

3. Normal business in Baghdad lags behind in restarting due to electrical failures (though couldn't one make an excellent argument that free enterprise sort of lagged behind for the past twenty years due to dictatorship?).

4. In a stunning reversal of inter-organizational relations, the American military resents the bureaucrats ordering them to do the dirty work.

5. Some Ba'athists are being reinstalled by the Allied occupation force, the Allies desperate to correct the infrastructure failures being blamed on them. Did Foreman hear about the 15,000-30,000 Ba'athists shut out of politics altogether? He didn't, did he? And, this should be taken somewhat in light of the fact that every far-reaching, authoritarian regime has left a few nameless underlings in initially tenable positions for, well, desperate and beleaguered American occupation forces. The Germans and Japanese complained, then they moved on.

Foreman at least has the consistency to report that "The failure to provide power, water, etc. may not necessarily be ORHA's fault."

Beyond that, it's a tempest in a teapot. It's not a mess, nor big trouble - if it is, then I question the depth of either Sullivan or Foreman's "pro-war" stance, because they obviously didn't know what they'd be getting into.

At a time like this, I wish I were finishing reading books on post-war Japan rather than just cracking them. Suffice to say, and a blow to Foreman and Sullivan's vicissitude: if the Iraq situation is as successful as the early years of the Japanese occupation, poor old Sergeant Peters won't see many yellow humanitarian packages in the hands of most Baghdad residents until about early 2005. Chances are, though, 2003 Iraq will be leaps and bounds ahead of Japan in 1945 and 1946, and those yellow packages might take several more weeks to be delivered.

Blogging isn't quite about meritocracy - but journalism still is. It's unfortunate to see rightfully respected men like Sullivan or Foreman, benefitting from their previous accountability, presenting an absolute historical vacuity; panicking, pointing fingers madly, or worse. It has got to stop.

As Ba'athists are mopped up and living infrastructure of the people are restored, the Americans are working to help Iraq to a democratic future:

The new top U.S. official in Iraq met for the first time Friday with the seven political leaders likely to form the core of a new government and said he found common ground on the way forward.

L. Paul Bremer, the U.S. civilian administrator, said they agreed on three priorities: restoring security, building democracy and rooting out the remnants of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party.

"It was a frank, open exchange — a very friendly and long discussion," he said.

The party's invitations included:

[Massoud Barzani, head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party;] Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress; Jalal Talabani, leader of the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan; Iyad Allawi of the Iraqi National Accord; Abdul Aziz al-Hakim of the Shiite Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and the brother of influential Shiite Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim; Naseer al-Chaderchi and a representative of the Shiite group al-Dawa.

Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim is the fellow who has been based in Iran and presumably takes his orders and funds from Tehran - I'd consider him a latter-day version of Tokuda Kyuichi, the Japanese Communist leader who, after his release from prison on MacArthur's general orders, set about trying to foment Marxist rebellion. Al-Hakim's first priority, like Tokuda, may be to befriend the Allied occupation forces when he isn't stirring up dissent among Shiites. Though al-Hakim seems eager to legally fasten law with religious morality, he has made statements indicating a curiously flexible stance between theocracy and pluralism: desiring a strong presence of Islam in Iraq's governance but insisting that women play an "essential role" in consensual government.

Al-Dawa is another party flirting with Islamic rule, and one that apparently boasts ties (though quietly, these days) with Hezbollah.

Fortunately, I suspect that the White House is well aware of who he is and that the now-golden statement from Bush, essentially declaring that an Islamic state will not be tolerated, is supported by the will to retire anyone who attempts to undermine the democratization process.

Other members are, for all intents and purposes, appreciably far away from theocratic and terrorist-tainted ideologies. Iyad Allawi's Iraqi National Accord is composed of former Ba'ath officials and military officers who have long opposed Saddam. They apparently don't get on well with my personal favorite - the inimitable, secular capitalist Ahmed Chalabi - which could mean differences in opinion that may damage the reconstitution process or else the foundation of a leftist, statist party.

Jalal Talabani is a proponent of a federalist Iraq that would allow for some degree of self-rule for the various divisions of government - the kind of decentralization that I would love to see.

Massoud Barzani has been reported in Arabist media to have made a few remarks that indicate a dour attitude to America's presence, but he wins the day's prize for powerful optimism:

Massoud Barzani...said the views of US and Iraqi leaders were "very close to each other, and in some cases they are identical".

Remember that in the States - the bastion of freedom and liberty - our politicians are daily at each other's throats. At this early stage in Iraq, Barzani's words are all we need to hear.

An item in Jay Nordlinger's "Impromptus":

"Dear Mr. Nordlinger: A couple of weeks ago, my son called here at home from somewhere near downtown Baghdad. It was in the middle of the night and I was a bit groggy. My boy is a 2LT and a Tank Commander in the 3-7 Cav. He told me, 'Pop, no matter what you hear or read in the media, remember this one thing: The Iraqi people are ecstatic to have us here.'

"I will tell you that these last few months have been very stressful for me. I will be glad when my boy is home."

This note was sent to me in response to my comment that, no matter what the Dowds say, the United States and its allies have done a very good thing in Iraq, and we shouldn't be talked out of a recognition of that.

Yes, I do believe that's what's going on over there. I love Drudge, but he too often becomes a highly respected, poster-bedecked telephone pole that inadvertantly mixes bad reporting with the good.

Reuters picks up the violin:

Some Iraqis who had celebrated the downfall of Saddam Hussein last month in a U.S.-led invasion now say insecurity outweighs any feeling of political freedom and liberation.

Unfortunately, my apparently uncoincidental reading of Japan's chaotic first years outweighs any feeling of sympathy or worry for the Iraqi people beyond what I already, reasonably, have invested. In fact, I'm inclined to suggest a swift kick in complainers' rear ends.

"Under Saddam we lived in fear, now we live in terror from crime and we live in poverty," said Othman, a taxi driver queuing to fill up his car with petrol.

The absence of law and order was also disrupting the delivery of humanitarian aid.

"We are concerned about the security situation," senior U.N. aid official Kenzo Oshima told a news conference in Baghdad. "Without adequate security, the delivery of humanitarian assistance will be hampered."

Iraqis complain that the cost of living has more than doubled in weeks. While the Iraqi dinar's exchange rate to the dollar has appreciated, prices of food and petrol have risen.

Suha Abdel-Hamid, a wealthy housewife, disappointed with the turn of events in Iraq, said she is now thinking of leaving the country in search of a safer and better life.

"Saddam was brutal and cruel. He suffocated us but at least he restored electricity and normality after the 1991 war. What are the Americans waiting for?" she told Reuters.

Quotations from a "wealthy housewife" ought to be ignored outright, for wealth under Saddam came from Saddam after it had been stolen from the Iraqi people. She misses skimming off the cream rising from the corpses on the bottom of the dream life - sorry, Suha, baby, the golden days are over.

One month. One month. I'm confident that the Iraqis quoted here do not represent the population - if they did, Iraq would be one lazy, petulant, ungracious, ignorant, impatient and vulgarly disloyal country.

It's not.

But Reuters' amplifying these complaints without any perspective is detrimental to the reality of the Iraqi situation. Really, how many democratizations do any of us remember? I read last night information that was corroborated in the other books: famine swept Japan in time for the 1945-1946 winter; random violence escalated to the point where Tokyo residents, even family members, were killing each other for scraps as late as 1947. Mass joblessness, starvation, a gigantic black market, and even a Moscow-funded Communist takeover that was successively defeated in the early 1950s were all part of early post-war life.

None of this is happening in Iraq. People are frightened, displaced, and without amenities. But they don't understand the extent to which lives are shattered after total war - how lucky they and their country really are - or how those suffering greatly can, with the help of benevolent victors, rise from the sorrow and destitution.

While those interested in the failure of Iraq's liberation won't cease trumpeting the slightest glimmer of doubt, we should not take them any more seriously.

Yesterday I remarked on the importance of de-Ba'athification in a post-war, democratic Iraq. Robert Pollock magnificently cited a magic number of 30,000 Ba'athists who are, for all intents and purposes, ideologically handcuffed to the past - and they would need to go.

The Allies, as providence would have it, have listened:

Between 15,000 and 30,000 Baath Party officials will be banned entirely from any future Iraqi government, a senior U.S. official said Friday. He said the move will eliminate Saddam Hussein's party and "put a stake in its heart." The official from the U.S. Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the move would help Iraq move on from the legacy of Saddam's regime.

"The Baath Party in Iraq is finished," the official said. "We mean to be sure that by this process, we will put a stake in its heart."

Excellent. Now, if the burgeoning political landscape in Baghdad and beyond can legally keep socialists and Islamists from gaining any footholds in the hearts of the population, Iraq will be well on its way to a prosperous pluralism before the decade is out.

An unlikely explanation from Time's Jim Lacey, an embedded reporter with the 101st Airborne, as to the whereabouts of Saddam's bio-chem-atomics:

It is likely that if Saddam no longer had a WMD program he did not know it. Why else would he endure over a decade of crippling sanctions? If Saddam had ended his quest for WMDs, it would have been in his best interest to open the doors wide and let the world see. By playing as the model citizen he would have regained control of his oil wealth and quickly been able to make Iraq a regional superpower again.

Instead, his henchmen did everything possible to obfuscate the true WMD picture and to thwart any inspection teams. If they had nothing to hide, they sure worked hard at trying to hide it. What if they were not just hiding a possible WMD program from inspectors, but also hiding from Saddam the fact that no such program existed?

While I'm sure Lacey is honest in his assessment, the idea teeters between illogical and silly. Saddam was a Stalinist dictator - and one is not identified as "Stalinist" without reason. Stalin was a frightful mix of violent narcissism and paranoia; rivals were removed, nationwide pogroms and purges conducted. Stalin made it his business to know as much about the daily lives and plans of the Russian people for fear of subterfuge or overthrow. Saddam's rule was quite similar, notably spattered with regular purges of his establishment. "Disloyalty," in one of its numerously accepted forms, was one qualification for execution, but, and very importantly, capability was another. Politics goes without saying - hence, say, the unpopular Christian-born Tariq Aziz's two-decade tenure with the Ba'ath Party that led to his final appointment as Ba'ath "Deputy Prime Minister." But anyone who was clever and audacious enough to begin his own microcosm in Saddam's arid world would be discovered and eliminated.

The most powerful men in Ba'ath intelligence services, political establishments and ruling councils were the greatest threats to Saddam, so one can assume that the most scrutiny and organizational checks and balances - setting agencies to rival one another, instituting paramilitary bulwarks between regular army units - were applied to them.

But as the West suspected from spy reports and the stories told by defectors, and is now discovering piece by piece, Saddam's interest in the everyday lives of his repressed populace was meticulous and universal:

Backed by tanks, U.S. troops have seized millions of Iraqi intelligence files from a citizens group involved in a daunting search for those who disappeared into the secret prisons of fallen president Saddam Hussein.

[...]

The files taken today were largely looted from the homes of senior officials of Hussein's ruling Baath Party, gathered up by local residents and delivered to U.S. military officials and Iraqi activists involved in helping to find the legions of missing. They are part of emerging archives kept by a government obsessed with internal vigilance and the careful record-keeping it entails.

[...]

Small black-and-white photographs appear with each opened file: a mustachioed university student in 1963 believed to be a communist, a suspicious army lieutenant in 1968. Children of prisoners will likely use the records to retrieve property lost as a result of their parents' disappearances.

And, of course, "the government" means Saddam - no one should doubt the absolute power jealously guarded by the man who idolized Vito Corleone. A couple of weeks back I fought off frightened depression while watching a television documentary on Saddam's twenty-year rule. Film, as fate would have it, caught a purge-and-intimidation exercise in Saddam's early days; a few hundred Ba'ath members sat themselves down in an auditorium for a presentation by their leader. Saddam unexpectedly gestured for a frightened man, apparently an informant, to step up to the podium and begin reading off the names of every person in the room. With every name, Saddam would ask, "Is he a traitor?" to which the man behind the microphone would answer in the affirmative or negative. Several names called out were indicated as the names of traitors; those men were seized and escorted out of the hall. As the threshing continued, the anxiety in the room boiled over to the point where a terrified sycophant stood up - a balding, mustachioed, sweating wretch - and began shouting Ba'athist and Pan-Arabist slogans in wild-eyed, groveling joy. He was joined, haphazardly, by others desperate to perform appeals for their would-be judicator.

When the list was complete, Saddam apparently asked the remaining group if their loyalty remained steadfast. Not surprisingly, heads bobbled in gibbering approval. Saddam, with his classic, murderous grin - poorly faked by the television double during Liberation, by the way - announced that he would reward and strengthen their devotion to his nation by executing the undedicated themselves.

This is an anecdote - but a telling anecdote, and one repeated, most likely, right up until March 19th of this year. Saddam was not a man who could be fooled from within his own country, let alone in respect to his only option for defense against the United States: a conventional army in ruins, only the specter of nuclear weapons could support the defiance Saddam so characteristically showed to the West. Biological and chemical weapons? Politically dangerous weapons, and even more so after the Cold War's fog had lifted and brought scrutiny to the "smallest" incident of their use - but useful nonetheless.

No dictator will be disarmed voluntarily by exterior forces or, if he retains the capacity for rule - as Saddam had - by his own men.

Those weapons exist, and they will be found.