Death was invited to meet the Americans, but instead he settled for Ba'athist scum:

American forces fended off an attempted ambush Sunday, killing at least [46] Iraqis and capturing eight others in the northern city of Samarra. At least five U.S. soldiers, [22] Iraqi attackers and a civilian were injured.

...A coalition source told Fox News that one of the U.S. convoys that came under attack was transporting a significant amount of money..."It was a well-organized and complex ambush, but they obviously picked the wrong convoy to attack. They could not have known," the source told Fox News.

That last quote undercuts the suggestion, mentioned by a few television anchors, that the ambush represents a major intelligence leak. Even Fedeyeen have an investment in self-preservation (or cowardice, whichever instructs their clandestine behavior more strongly) and you'd assume wouldn't have engaged in such a straightforward engagement if they had complete information. But if the White House's accelerated drafting of Iraqis - and diminished abilities to discern out-of-work innocents from terrorist plants - did cause a leak that led to this attack, we can draw two conclusions about the insurgents.

First: despite the initial psychological and political shock the Allies took watching a briefly "quiet" postwar Iraq turn to scores of organized attacks daily, the terrorists are no more capable of military victory than they were before Saddam's army fired a shot. Fought against fairly, American troops (ambushed, no less) are unbeatable.

Second: the insurgency is growing desperate, or factious, or impatient, or directionless, or a combination of all four losing qualities. Why else would over fifty Fedeyeen expose themselves and provide the Allies with a congregated target? Stupidity is what led the Hussein brothers to hole up together and die together; could forces of terror have too finally run out of ideas and straight into dumb thug tactics? The "Mogadishu" window has passed; Bush is tenacious with his most controversial foreign policies, not diffident, and the American public has come out of this confusing summer and fall with majority support for him intact. Against a reliable American homefront, Iraq's insurgents are faced with a strategic impossibility, and the choice between sniping at foreign targets (provoking costly retaliation) and Iraqis (turning their fear into a shared, angry determination alongside the Allies).

In our hearts, I think, those of us considering ourselves optimists always knew that Iraq would succeed as a free and peaceful state. But it's always been a question of how soon problems of life and death would be replaced by civil issues - writing a constitution, struggling culturally, rebuilding industries and academies, good problems like that. 5,000 insurgents and their small group of Iraqi supporters will still take time to defeat; but that unrecoverable decline may actually have begun over the past weeks.

JUST A NOTE: The casualty figures have changed twice, now. I'll update accordingly.

Headlines are fluttering with the latest grandstanding from the boastful Shiite Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani. Some on the right are anywhere between knit-browed and ready to size up cemetary plots for Iraq's future. Certainly, a would-be theocrat punching above his weight and disrupting plans for a secular establishment is no small challenge to Paul Bremer and Iraq's Governing Council. But I'm curious as to what these worriers considered would be the inevitable political and societal obstacles in Iraq's transition to freedom. Extremists are in their element while nations reform - it is, forgive the pun, an occupational hazard. What's more, fundamentalist Shiite rule is questionable, especially since Shiites are the least of the CPA's worries:

The US, which has been wary of installing a government dominated by Shiites in Iraq, has concluded that such a development is virtually inevitable and not necessarily harmful to US interests.

US officials said that fears of an Iranian-style - and Iranian-influenced - theocracy in Baghdad had faded because it had become clear that Iraq's Shiite population was not a monolithic bloc and not necessarily dominated by Tehran.

We've known this for a while, too. And although it is a concession by observers that Iraqi Shiites are attracted to at least the romance of Iraq officially recognizing Islam, a recent op-ed echoes the statements of perspective I've been making in light of theocracy fears in Afghanistan:

It's no wonder that we're having a hard time teaching Jeffersonian democracy to the Iraqis. It's still controversial in America.

Take the precincts where Roy Moore holds sway. Moore, recently ousted as chief justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, has become the standard-bearer for Christian conservatives who believe that the United States is a "Christian nation." He has inspired hundreds of thousands of followers.

Culturally recognizing divinity as the basis for law, which I enjoy doing, is one thing; recognizing as much by completely ignoring an order of the state is quite another. And yes, it happened right at home. Church and state: the argument is an eternal one. The bottom line? Politically canny troublemakers like Sistani, while potentially dangerous and undeserving of more concessions than strategically necessary, can neither hold the public's attention nor enjoy its support for long if their respective desires are only tangential. As we've seen, most Iraqis want nothing to do with totalitarianism - secular or religious.

I'm in between recipes. Shopping went well - that's worth a story in the near future.

You remember the plug being pulled on al Arabiya in Iraq, don't you? I agreed with the decision made by the CPA and the Governing Council; and it turns out their broad explanations had substantiation (via IP). When al Arabiya and al Jazeera inevitably begin to carp and moan, they ought to consider themselves lucky to only have been banned - and not prosecuted as conspirators. Good riddance to shills for evil.

Allied resolve combined with the bravery and determination of everyday Iraqis hasn't been lost on the forces of terror:

Attacks on American troops in Iraq have declined in the last two weeks and insurgents are increasingly targeting Iraqis working with the U.S.-led coalition in an effort to intimidate them, the top U.S. civilian and military leaders here said Tuesday. L. Paul Bremer III said the insurgents' recent attacks on the coalition itself were not having the desired effect, so they were turning to the Iraqis who help occupation forces.

...They have failed to intimidate the coalition," he said. "They have now begun a pattern of trying to intimidate innocent Iraqis. They will not succeed...If Saddam taught the Iraqis nothing else it was how to endure the depredations of thugs."

[General John] Abizaid said that the number of daily attacks on coalition forces were down by about half over the last two weeks.

The immediate prospect - the potential loss of life - is as disturbing as terrorist attacks on Israelis. But to attack the Iraqi people now seems to be a desperate measure taken by the insurgents. If the terrorists were gaining any sort of strategic upper hand, attacks against troops would be increasing in frequency, potency and duration; operations like Iron Hammer and Ivy Cyclone have helped crush those ambitions. Unable to achieve military superiority, the insurgents have often turned to plying the public. With the exception of pockets that began the occupation as strongly pro-Ba'athist, there's been no luck in Iraq: the ridiculous "Saddam tapes" haven't wooed people, attacks on soft targets have only increased their willingness to aid Allied forces with intelligence, and in spite of this difficult Ramadan the population lurches forward towards progress.

No option remains, it would seem, except cowing people into submission. Some observers are wary of this attrition of the will. And Iraqis see the danger, too. But Alaa wisely attributes recent actions to a force short on time and resources. Civil society in Iraq will produce its own doubt and frustration, but this window of fear and despair is closing fast.

FISH IN A DESERT: More on the insurgency's inherent weakness.

For the time being, count one less Arabist/Islamist/statist propaganda outlet:

The U.S.-appointed Governing Council banned a popular Arab satellite news channel from broadcasting from Iraq and seized equipment from its bureau in Baghdad on Monday after it aired a taped message purportedly from former president Saddam Hussein calling for attacks on Iraqis cooperating with the U.S. occupation.

U.S.-appointed or not, Iraq's current leaders are in step with the entire political spectrum (Item 'III') and offer powerful rationale for their actions:

Talabani said the threat amounted to "an incitement to murder."

"Inciting murder or violence is illegal under the laws of the entire world," he said. "Saddam in our eyes is a criminal, a torturer, a war criminal and whoever disseminates for him exposes himself to legal punishment."

Censorship is a delicate matter and should be used sparingly. In a yet-unstable country lacking a functioning elected government, however, press agencies casually sympathetic to the enemies of freedom - one of them accused of being infiltrated by Saddam's henchmen - have no place in a nascent public forum. Freedom demands responsibility, and for censorship this is one of those qualifying situations.

The Iraqis aren't fools:

According to a survey by the Psychological Research Centre of Baghdad University, 71.5 per cent of Iraqis questioned thought the American occupation was necessary at least for a while. This compared to 42 per cent of Iraqis in a similar survey by the centre in June.

The report said:"This shows an acceptance of the foreign presence as a temporary solution because of the fear, confusion and absence of law and order following the collapse of the old regime."

By now the majority of peaceful, law-abiding Iraqis should understand not only that America seeks to bring their country to democratic autonomy as quickly as possible, but that the withdrawal of troops from Iraq to other fronts - once Iraq is reasonably secure - is a shared goal, as well. We hear them.

Additionally, heavy offensives against terrorists have far outweighed any disruption of day-to-day activities by the population: according to a Brigadier General in Baghdad, attacks are down 70 percent. While the enemy is still active - after a foiled convoy ambush in Samara, terrorists struck in towns to just the north and south Baghdad - it works in vain, having already lost. American and Iraqi will has only been strengthened by the trials.

Chief Wiggles announces spectacular news - the number of boxes received by his unit in Baghdad has exceeded 1,000. The Chief, a man of adamantine optimism, responds to the success as only he could:

A BIG THANK YOU TO EVERYONE THAT HAS PARTICIPATED SO FAR! NOW LET'S ADD A ZERO TO THE END AND MAKE IT 10,000!

Ten thousand, indeed. That effort will certainly move forward as the list of fourteen private companies and community associations holding toy drives grows. Most of the organizations to which I belong are small, and near the limit of their capabilities tending to local and regional functions; so my participation will probably continue to be personal (though I may be able to talk friends and family into donating, especially the rightward ones). Which turns it over to you, reader: do you belong to a large church or other organization that could provide for Chief Wiggles' Toys for Iraq campaign with even light member involvement? If people have questions, show them what good deeds have been accomplished already.

Zeyad on the rufous Ba'athist worth a cool $10 million:

By the way, Izzat is nicknamed 'Abu Al-thalij' or the ice man by Iraqis, referring to his job before he joined the party when he used to sell and deliver ice cubes during hot summers. Some people also call him 'Abu breiss', a common domestic lizard found all over Iraq which is skinny and repugnant and has a striking resemblance to Izzat.

Isn't the blogosphere the best long-distance cultural exchange program ever devised?

It's about time James Lileks fisked the Arab MoDo, Salam Pax. Via IP.

So there I was, looking in my archives for some blogging on the earliest political maneuvers made by Democrats on the war (sometime shortly after the fall of the Taliban, I believe), as the White House has begun to prepare for 2004. In visiting old entries, I found this gem, written innocently enough back in January while United Nations Security Council proceedings were still underway.

By now you're familiar with the meme used by Democrats and the left, claiming that the Bush administration had "no plan" for postwar Iraq. Serious-minded people know that's bunk straight off; but the point against can be further made by the mainstream media's own reports indicating preparations for stabilizing and democratizing Iraq. About a week ago, someone dug up a New York Times editorial praising Bush, speaking to the American Enterprise Institute, for "sketch[ing] an expansive vision last night [at his American Enterprise Institute speech] of what he expects to accomplish by a war in Iraq," after the newspaper accused the White House of "shifting its case" for war.

Well, the adminstration had more than speeches about its plans - and the New York Times reported that, too (abstract is here, you need to pay for the full version):

Washington, January 5 - President Bush's national security team is assembling final plans for administering and democratizing Iraq after the expected ouster of Saddam Hussein. Those plans call for a heavy American military presence in the country for at least 18 months, military trials of only the most senior Iraqi leaders and quick takeover of the country's oil fields to pay for reconstruction. The proposals, according to administration officials who have been developing them for several months, have been discussed informally with Mr. Bush in considerable detail. They would amount to the most ambitious American effort to administer a country since the occupations of Japan and Germany at the end of World War II. With Mr. Bush's return here this afternoon, his principal foreign policy advisers are expected to shape the final details in White House meetings and then formally present them to the president.

Many elements of the plans are highly classified, and some are still being debated as Mr. Bush's team tries to allay concerns that the United States would seek to be a colonial power in Iraq. But the broad outlines show the enormous complexity of the task in months ahead, and point to some of the difficulties that would follow even a swift and successful removal of Mr. Hussein from power, including these:

Though Mr. Bush came to office expressing distaste for using the military for what he called nation building, the Pentagon is preparing for at least a year and a half of military control of Iraq, with forces that would keep the peace, hunt down Mr. Hussein's top leaders and weapons of mass destruction and, in the words of one of Mr. Bush's senior advisers, ''keep the country whole.''

A civilian administrator -- perhaps designated by the United Nations -- would run the country's economy, rebuild its schools and political institutions, and administer aid programs. Placing those powers in nonmilitary hands, administration officials hope, will quell Arab concerns that a military commander would wield the kind of unchallenged authority that Gen. Douglas MacArthur exercised as supreme commander in Japan.

Only ''key'' senior officials of the Hussein government ''would need to be removed and called to account,'' according to an administration document summarizing plans for war trials. People in the Iraqi hierarchy who help bring down the government may be offered leniency.

The administration plan says, ''Government elements closely identified with Saddam's regime, such as the revolutionary courts or the special security organization, will be eliminated, but much of the rest of the government will be reformed and kept.''

While publicly saying Iraqi oil would remain what one senior official calls ''the patrimony of the Iraqi people,'' the administration is debating how to protect oil fields during the conflict and how an occupied Iraq would be represented in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, if at all.

After long debate, especially between the Pentagon and the State Department, the White House has rejected for now the idea of creating a provisional government before any invasion.

Here's the king:

Officials involved in the planning caution that no matter how detailed their plans, many crucial decisions would have to be made on the ground in Iraq...Much also depends on whether the arriving American troops would be welcomed or shot at, and the Central Intelligence Agency has been drawing up scenarios that range from a friendly occupation to a hostile one.

Jay Garner didn't work with the ground situation; he was dropped. Strategies and tactics used by various military branches of various countries, each operating in different parts of Iraq, have been modified frequently - most significantly the Sunni Triangle crackdown, Operation Iron Hammer. And with the announcement of accelerated transfer of power to Iraqis, prolonged military supremacy has been abandoned:

Yet under all of the possibilities, the American military would remain the central player in running the country for some time.

The military will, however, remain as a stabilizing force. The article continues:

The Pentagon has warned that it would take at least a year to be certain that all of Mr. Hussein's weapons stores were destroyed.

Notably, the administration's written description of its goals include these two objectives: ''preserve Iraq as a unitary state, with its territorial integrity intact,'' and ''prevent unhelpful outside interference, military or nonmilitary,'' apparently a warning to neighboring countries.

The adminstration was ready for the gamut of reactions from the Iraqi population, Saddam's squirreling away of weapons, removing the Ba'athist regime without eviscerating municipal systems and keeping the dictatorial region at bay. What about an exit plan - did they have one of those? In as plain words as Donald Rumsfeld's, the adminstration did:

''I don't think we're talking about months,'' one of Mr. Bush's top advisers said of the planned occupation. ''But I don't think we're talking a lot of years, either.''

President Bush and his administration were prepared to improvise under the worst conditions after deposing Saddam Hussein - but they started with a plan. Tell that to Mr. Dean, Mr. Edwards, Mr. Gephardt, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Lieberman, and Mr. Clark, who feel compelled to campaign on doubt through deception.