![]() |
|
Page 1 | Page 2 | Page 3 | Page 4 | Page 5 | Page 6 | Page 7 | Page 8 | Page 9 | Page 10 | Page 11 | Page 12 | Page 13 | Page 14 | Page 15 | Page 16 | Page 17 | Page 18 | Page 19 | Page 20 | Page 21 | Page 22 | Page 23 | Page 24 | Page 25 | Page 26 | Page 27 | Page 28 | Page 29 | Page 30 | Page 31 | Page 32 | Page 33 | Page 34 | Page 35 | Page 36 | Page 37 | Page 38 | Page 39 | Page 40 | Page 41 | Page 42 | Page 43 | Page 44 | Page 45 | Page 46 | Page 47 | Page 48 | Page 49 | Page 50
Michael Ubaldi, April 28, 2004.
This is what I've been waiting for: "Our military commanders will take whatever actions necessary to secure Fallujah," Bush said at the White House. While Bush said there were "pockets of resistance" in the Iraqi city, he insisted that "most of Fallujah is returning to normal."
INDISPENSABLE: A few thoughts. As to be expected, most news agencies are continuing their indifferent spin on Fallujah. According to one report, Kofi Annan isn't keen on the Marines sending insurgents First Class to the great beyond. Really. Annan wasn't keen on preventing the exploitation of Iraqis, either, so what else is new? "Violence erupts" is a winning headline from the New York Times, as if Americans and the enemy were street gangs from West Side Story, just hanging around, looking to rumble. Watch it, don't let that can of ACME Violence bust open! But the Christian Science Monitor got things right. Michael Ubaldi, April 28, 2004.
Claudia Rosett on the oil-for-food travesty: In a world beset right now by terrorist threats — which depend on terrorist financing — it's time to acknowledge that the U.N.'s Oil-for-Food program was worse than simply a case of grand larceny. Given Saddam's proclivities for deceit and violence, Oil-for-Food was also a menace to security. By letting Saddam pick his own business partners and draw up his own shopping lists, by keeping the details of his contracts and accounts secret, and by then failing abjectly to supervise the process, the U.N. — through a program meant to aid the people of Iraq — enabled Saddam to line his pockets while bankrolling his pals world-wide.
In Oil-for-Food, "Every contract tells a story," says John Fawcett, a financial investigator with the New York law firm of Kreindler & Kreindler LLP, which has sued the financial sponsors of Sept. 11 on behalf of the victims and their families. In an interview, Mr. Fawcett and his colleague, Christine Negroni, run down the lists of Oil-for-Food authorized oil buyers and relief suppliers, pointing out likely terrorist connections. One authorized oil buyer, they note, was a remnant of the defunct global criminal bank, BCCI. Another was close to the Taliban while Osama bin Laden was on the rise in Afghanistan; a third was linked to a bank in the Bahamas involved in al Qaeda's financial network; a fourth had a close connection to one of Saddam's would-be nuclear-bomb makers.
Michael Ubaldi, April 27, 2004.
Last night I noted some of David Kay's statements that haven't stuck in our minds as well as they should. Glenn Reynolds found more, from David Kay and beyond: New evidence out of Iraq suggests that the U.S. effort to track down Saddam Hussein's missing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is having better success than is being reported. Key assertions by the intelligence community that were widely judged in the media and by critics of President George W. Bush as having been false are turning out to have been true after all. But this stunning news has received little attention from the major media, and the president's critics continue to insist that "no weapons" have been found.
Michael Ubaldi, April 27, 2004.
Most of the wire reports from Fallujah are operating under the assumption that the so-called ceasefire was intended to produce something more than time for Allied military repositioning and an ill-fated, probably ill-conceived settlement offer — as if the amalgamation of terrorists, criminals, Ba'athists and thugs would sign a treaty, become Born Again and take up accounting, gardening and badminton. "Shaky ceasefire" here and "deal in doubt" there. A lot of ink and television time is being devoted to the testimony of "experts." What about experts with firsthand accounts of the situation: After saying that during the cease-fire his men have been "shot at, sniped, and mortared" every day, [1st Sgt. Bill] Skiles said the only solution was to "terminate them (the rebels)." "Let us finish it," he said, adding that the peace talks and cease-fire are only giving the insurgents time to get stronger.
MARINES KNOW BEST: If it hasn't become completely obvious, the Marine Corps' performance in the face of this month's insurgent offensive has infused me with the incredible respect due the Few and the Proud. It's not that I lacked respect; I just couldn't realize how capable and unflappable this fighting force is until they were visibly put to the test. Four years ago I worked with an inactive Marine. He only told a few stories about his service but each one was brimming with pride, respect and a cultural ecumenism about the world — "Iraqis, they're just like us," he happened to tell me — that one might not otherwise assign to the leathernecks. The depth and intelligence of a soldier is more important than we civilians can truly grasp. Belmont Club is again offering measured optimism. The strategic outlook of Fallujah is uncertain, complicated by diplomacy with strongmen; tactically, the Marines have less to worry about than the enemy. POINT TAKEN: When Mort Kondracke is convinced that the Fallujah action is moving comfortably according to plan, there's something to it. If political interaction in the form of negotiations or further ceasefires is only a gambit for the Marines to better envelop the enemy, you'll hear no complaints from me. Truthfully, the length of this past operational pause took me by surprise, as it did others. After today's denial of resources, however, the completion of an Iraqi-Allied military victory that began two weeks ago may be back on the agenda. For the sake of Iraq and the war on terror, one can only hope. Michael Ubaldi, April 26, 2004.
The editorial page of the Wall Street Journal has repeatedly proven itself to be the White House's most consistent and fair critic on the right; when the Journal takes issue with President Bush, we're best to read. Yesterday's news told the public that, reportedly from the direct decision of the president, a full-scale offensive in Fallujah to destroy the isolated, Syrian-Saudi-terrorist-Ba'athist mixer was delayed in favor of strict patrols. The Journal wasn't impressed, and though their fear of terrorists having the foresight and discretion to simply wait out the American-Iraqi sweeps — again, the enemies of freedom have been foolish enough to engage Marines in conventional combat — the newspaper's warning ought to be heeded: We hope this doesn't represent a decision by coalition political leaders to shrink from the military campaign that is inevitable. Sooner or later the Baath remnants, jihadists and criminals who have used Fallujah as a sanctuary have to be killed. They can't be bargained with, they can't be reasoned with, because for them a peaceful transition to Iraqi control after June 30 means defeat. If the estimated 2,000 or so insurgents decide to allow Marine patrols, it will be because they have concluded it is safer to melt away to kill Americans another day rather than fight to the death in Fallujah now.
It atmospherically recalls Pershing, greeting newly arrived officers and sizing them up for toughness, before putting them on a steam launch to Jolo with a month's pay, a detachment of Scouts and the promise that the launch would be back to collect whoever survived. The Marines snipers may now have open season on any armed men in the Fallujah streets, where Americans and Iraqis of 'good character' will find it tested as never before. The Iraqi nation will be born or fail in Fallujah, but if they succeed, the words "Anywhere, Anytime" will be translated into Arabic.
Michael Ubaldi, April 25, 2004.
Now I know why Glenn Reynolds has gone through spates of linking to Belmont Club: as the weekend winds to a close and the politically mandated halts in action in Najaf and Fallujah wear thin, many of us are struggling with our hopes for success, the doubt natural to all hearts, and the excessive misgivings we hear and read. Knowledge is power — or more precisely, makes for a calmer soul, so start at the top of the page and scroll. Michael Ubaldi, April 24, 2004.
Bastard Sword, whose excellent work has been noted here before, is taking a walk on the serious side and responding to Steven Den Beste's run-in with French journalists who happen to be on the terrorists' side. Concluding, he encapsulates the makeover on the war on terror many press agencies are attempting: Well, we already know that Iraq is filled with remnant Ba'athists and fundamentalist revolutionaries itching to sieze power, this is not news. We know they can't win if we don't let them, yet the press continues to push the idea that we are either beset on the one hand or overbearing on the other. Basically what we see in these contradictory opinions are competing mental models of how it is we eventually get defeated, and why. But the trouble with having a bad storyline is that the facts on the ground keep defying prediction, as if the actors won't stick to the script. So writing becomes a constant scramble to gloss over what you'd just set up for upcoming episodes while scrambling to make the new dialogue fit the story. Such scrambles always make for fun Fisks since you can just keep pulling up the same person's contradictory statements from a few weeks prior.
Michael Ubaldi, April 23, 2004.
Military sources confidently report that Syria, longtime state sponsor of terrorism, is behind a good deal of terrorist and paramilitary activity in Iraq: Syria is "facilitating" the movement of foreign fighters into Iraq and helping supply them with arms, according to U.S. military officials with access to intelligence reports. ...Officials said Syrian help includes facilitating their border crossing, arming them and allowing them to return for fresh supplies. Asked how conclusive U.S. intelligence is on Syrian aid, one official said, "No doubt about it."
Michael Ubaldi, April 22, 2004.
It's true that they look to America and the West for support but the optimistic Iraqi bloggers to whom I link are, for me, daily inspirations. Omar particularly, with his aptly named collective weblog Iraq the Model. Omar was in Basra when terrorists struck — his brother Mohammed believes Omar to to be okay, yet he took the occasion to reflect on his frustrations and hopes: The hardest thing is that I have to fight more, and I will, but God, please give me the strength. Why should I be strong while watching others run away; Spain, Honduras, Thailand, human organizations, the UN and all the others who want (and it’s their right I must say) to avoid the dangers. But why did they disappoint us? Why abandon us in this moment when we really need them? Will they come back when conditions improve? Most likely, but who will need them then!!? We don’t need doctors and engineers. We have enough of those and large numbers of Iraqi doctor, teachers and engineers are working abroad. We do export minds, and some of those have returned and are doing their job and some are on their way back. We need political, financial and military support, and once we get rid of the terrorists, WE will show you what we can do, and we will not forget those who helped us, they will remain as friends and allies, that’s from a political point of view. As for me, they will remain as my real family, my brothers and sisters.
Michael Ubaldi, April 22, 2004.
Wretchard at Belmont Club, sifting through reports from Iraq, found a Defense Department overview on the veritable "wretched hive of scum and villainy" that is the city of Fallujah. In shorthand, even beyond the vast differences in cultural progress and security between the Sunni Triangle and the rest of Iraq, Fallujah is not an accurate reflection of today's Iraq: While Iraq is laced with antiquities, Fallujah isn't one of them. Just after World War II, the population of the town was around 10,000. The city, about 40 miles west of Baghdad, is on the edge of the desert, and now has about 300,000 citizens. It is a dry and arid landscape, made productive only because of extensive irrigation from the nearby Euphrates River. It was, however, located on the main routes into Jordan and Syria. And in crime, as in real estate, location is everything. The city was on the main route for smugglers, and sheltered a number of very successful crime lords. ...When Saddam Hussein took power in 1979, the city received a boost. Many of the people in Fallujah supported Saddam, and many of his closest advisors, highest- ranking military officers and high-ranking members of the Baath Party came from Fallujah, Ramadi, Tikrit and other areas in the center of the Sunni Triangle. Arab tribes in and around the city also owed fealty to Saddam and became bastions of the regime. Hussein returned the favor by building factories in the city and providing jobs for his chosen people.
Since the U.S.-led liberation of Iraq, former regime supporters have allied themselves with foreign fighters who seem to be entering Iraq via Syria, officials said. U.S. officials suspect that members of al Qaeda affiliate Ansar al-Islam have cells in the city. Other terror groups have allied themselves with former regime elements and Sunni extremists, making for a very volatile mix. Officials said these groups intimidate the larger population of Fallujah, and these citizens seem to be caught in the middle. If the people of Fallujah cooperate with the former regime members, then coalition forces will come after them. If they cooperate with the coalition, then they will be killed.
|
|
![]() |