Iraqi militias — some organized, some not; some with good intentions and others without — have stood as a silent obstacle to concentrating power in authorized federal and provincial entities. The more ominous squatters and schemers, like the "Mahdi" mob of phony cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's, enjoyed support from certain segments of Iraq's population; Allied military forces anticipated a greater threat to civil order if these groups were forcibly dispersed without sufficient, direct provocation. Al-Sadr tripped that wire when he attempted conventional warfare against American troops, bringing his own house down. The rest remain quiet or coy.

Today, Prime Minister Iyad Allawi presents his solution to this lingering postwar concern, rewarding militias as he extracts their oath of national loyalty, and punishing the destruction of al-Sadr:

Nine major political parties agreed today to disband their militias, the interim prime minister said today. The agreement does not include the militia of radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Prime Minister Iyad Allawi said about 100,000 armed individuals will enter civilian life or take jobs in the state police or security services. The militias have been credited with helping bring about the downfall of Saddam Hussein.

"By doing this, we reward their heroism and sacrifices, while making Iraq stronger and eliminating armed forces outside of government control," Allawi said in a prepared statement. ...None of the nine militias has been fighting the government and most are controlled by mainstream political movements represented in the government.

This could be a major victory for order and stability if enforced. Today's Iraq, made difficult by those committed to thwarting its rebirth, shouldn't cause us to lose sight of our own rights preserved by limiting the power of government: "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." Understanding the peaceful nature of men like Omar, Zeyad, Alaa, Ali and Mohammed makes clear why giving Iraqi citizens the means to defend themselves — and treating well those who have done so — would help combat terrorism now and crime in the next few years to come.

Omar has been at the Arab forums again and has a report. Contrary to popular canard, the deposition of Saddam Hussein and the slow transformation of Iraq into a pluralist democracy has shaken Near East societies to their core. People are talking about what Iraq's freedom means — for Iraqis and for themselves. Syrians, Omar notes, have been the most combative and full of ridicule. But more Iraqis are defending their new friends and way of life, and not without a bit of salt:

My reply is directed to the two gentlemen, Mohammed and Firas from Syria: actually I want to state here that the Syrians are the last to have the right to criticize the new Iraqi government. Whatever this government’s nature is, the president didn't [inherit] the throne from his father. Your house is built of glass, gentlemen, and you know it's not difficult to smash it.

I see good years ahead for Iraq. And I look forward to seeing what leaders — political, philosophical, spiritual — will emerge.

It's difficult not to be left in speechless awe of a veteran as he calmly tells you what he knows and believes. Fox and Friends has just finished interviewing a paratrooper who invaded Normandy. In a measured monotone he described his injuries — hit by a grenade thrown by a German over a hedgerow, left for dead, then hit again by a shell when he woke up half an hour later, before being "patched up pretty good" and jumping into Holland for Operation Market Garden a short time later.

Was he surprised that the World War II Memorial took so long to be come about? No, he said, "we weren't thinking about it. We came out of a great depression, fought a world war and won. When we came back we said, 'We don't want to be in another depression,' and went to work.'"

What did he think about Iraq? Was it justified? "You see," he said, "after we found all the concentration camps, the graves and the ovens, people criticized us for not acting sooner. We couldn't have acted sooner; all of that went on while we had a navy at the bottom of the ocean and were training with broomsticks. Today, we found another dictator who was doing the same things to his own people; we removed him, and still we are criticized. But yes, I think it was the right thing to do."

Islamofascists in Iraq were dealt another blow:

Iraqi police forces have detained Umar Baziyani, an associate of terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, U.S. Central Command announced Friday. Baziyani is known to have ties to several extremist terrorist groups in Iraq and is believed to be responsible for the death and injury of scores of innocent Iraqi citizens, according to Centcom. Authorities say Baziyani is also wanted in connection with anti-coalition activities.

Baziyani was detained on May 30 in Baghdad, according to Centcom. He's providing information to coalition forces.

"His capture removes one of al-Zarqawi’s most valuable officers from his network," according to the Centcom statement.

Most important in this report is the fact that it was the Iraqi police who nabbed Baziyani. Though the phrase "Iraqi face" has been overused to the point of use as an excuse for American follow-through, Iraq's autonomy and definition as a democracy depends upon the establishment of a common good, empowered by the people to bear arms. In Iraq's unfinished and trying state, good advice is heard stateside less often than bad.

One of the most resilient — but poorly reasoned — remonstrations since the occupation began last April has been for the retention of the Iraqi army. Saddam's army: the fragmented, internecine force made up of everyone from unwilling conscripts to knuckleheaded thugs to crossover Islamist terrorists, with the sole purpose of sustaining Ba'athist reign through external conquest and the repression of Iraq's population. It doesn't take a military expert to divine how fundamental a country's authoritarian culture is to its armed forces: in Iraq, military structure, operation and morale all ran on the currency of mutual fear and distrust.

Beyond function, Saddam's military served well as a terrifying symbol of the dictator's power and brutality. Even if keeping the army weren't a betrayal of principle, it would be an offense to natural allies. Like the Ba'ath Party's ubiquity, the army's continued existence implied Saddam's permanence: one need not look beyond the nervous reaction from Shiites and Kurds at the mere sight of former Republican Guard General Jassim Mohammed Saleh in Fallujah before the Marines got wise and yanked him. Cultural repercussions of retention are a variable we will never, thankfully, know.

The military was no more than the sum of its parts. In Saddam's uniform, the murderous succeeded and the unwilling were cannibalized. Retraining military-aged men in Iraq to protect and serve, rather than torment, civilians — a role agreed upon by proponents and opponents alike — would have required the standing army's complete disassembling, from hierarchy to ethos, effectively "disbanding" it anyway.

Some retention proponents claim, as Bill O'Reilly loudly did on television last night, that the Bush administration's refusal to co-opt Saddam's war machine is directly responsible for the Ba'athist insurgency centered in the Sunni Triangle and concentrated in Fallujah. But when the number of assailants — including Syrians, Saudis, al Qaeda and other terrorists — is believed less than a couple thousand or more, and Saddam's forces were estimated before the campaign at half a million, how can anyone tell that the "dead-enders" disrupting Iraq's democratization today would have acted any differently if invited to keep their old uniforms?

What's both tragic and worth a chuckle — laughter to offset the tragedy — is that American command is recruiting former army soldiers. But it's done under American rules:

U.S. military advisers are forming an all-Iraqi counterinsurgency force and training it in guerrilla tactics like ambushing trucks and hiding alongside the road camouflaged as bushes. The new force, called the Iraqi National Task Force, is the most ambitious effort yet to fight the uprising using Iraqis, and it already has 1,000 soldiers with plans to grow to 7,000.

It is being created as a response to the refusal of some regular Iraqi soldiers to face insurgents in Fallujah two months ago. That breakdown culminated in a tense standoff on an airfield with eight U.S. Marines surrounded by an angry group of 200 armed Iraqis who refused to board helicopters.

"Basically, that scene was the trigger," said Maj. Gen. Paul D. Eaton, the senior military adviser in charge of training Iraqi security forces. "It was our fault. We tried to send the Iraqi army into Fallujah before they were ready, and they pushed back. After that, we realized we needed a force that was specially designed to fight in urban areas and ready to fight fellow Iraqis."

The general said that all soldiers who volunteered for the task force had to agree to a mission statement pledging they will fight terrorists, former elements of Saddam Hussein's regime and insurgents within Iraq. Some of the soldiers take an oath; others make a more informal commitment to their commanders.

Nor can it be said that Iraqis are invisible in the countrywide strategy:

U.S. advisers say they are pleased with the progress. The original goal for the police force was 85,000 officers; 92,000 have been hired. The border patrol is fully staffed at 17,000 officers, and so is the facility protection services at 74,000 officers. The civil defense corps is at 25,000, with another 15,000 soldiers to go. The army is the furthest from its goal, with 7,000 soldiers of the 35,000 intended.

This developing story is one of trial and error — patience. (Iraqi courage never fails to astound, such numbers in spite of so many terrorist attacks against recruits.) Those who still harangue the dissolution of Saddam's army can be commended for wishing the perfect not to be made an enemy of the better. But in Iraq's uneasy circumstances, the better shouldn't be made an enemy of the expedient.

Bad news and good news from Amy Ridenour. The United States is still working arrangements for Iraqi sovereignty and security through the bureaucrat-and-dictator country club known as the United Nations — that's the bad news. The good news is that the Bush administration doesn't seem to have taken the UN seriously for a moment.

Sergeant Dan Kissane, in Iraq, sent me an e-mail titled "You would have been proud":

I had a moment that brought you to mind the other day. I was riding in the commander's hatch on my panzer, wearing Bono-style fly sunglasses, and blasting Depeche Mode's "A Question of Time." British synth pop definitely has a place in this man's Army.

My response: A man after my own heart. I don't know if the Pentagon will go for black leather or chain link uniforms; maybe they'll be more amenable to requiring recruits to get a Violator Rose tattoo. Both are worth a try. The real issue here is why you're not in Army recruiting videos. Set to music. ...Like Depeche Mode. With a girl on each arm, in true DM style (no, not work-safe).

UPDATE: Fixed the last link. Yes, the racy one. Only because the world needs to know that the boys in Depeche Mode aren't sissies.

For all his bravado and interruption of debate panel colleagues, Juan Williams' historical perspective can be lacking. Williams' contribution from atop his soapbox on Special Report with Brit Hume last night was that the Iraqi interim government lacks a mandate, having been elected from within political classes, and won't be supported by the Iraqi people. His second point is repudiated by the cultural and spiritual leader of Iraq's Shiite majority, Ayatollah al-Sistani, having given his earnest blessing to the nominations of Ayad Allawi, Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer, Ibrahim Jaffari and Roj Nuri Shawis. But in his first claim, Williams seems to have forgotten that his own country's first president, George Washington, was elected by means neither direct nor popular. On February 4, 1789, sixty-nine electors from ten of the thirteen American states unanimously elected Washington with one of their two allotted votes. The electors were chosen by the state legislatures according to Article II, Section 1 of the United States Constitution. Three states did not participate. New York, in a nod to John Hancock's exasperation in musical 1776 of "What in hell goes on in New York!", failed to appoint electors. North Carolina's and Rhode Island's legislatures had not yet ratified the Constitution at the time of election.

Washington's ascent wouldn't exactly meet Williams' golden standard of open elections but history books fail to note any disintegration of the states as enraged throngs claimed disenfranchisement and rejected their unmandated government.

And Iraq doesn't even have a permanent constitution. Zeyad, who is slightly more invested in the country's leadership than Williams, is reasonable in his appraisal:

On the other hand [of Mashal Ajil al-Yawer's tribalist ties], I perceive that the majority of Iraqis have accepted him as president, even welcomed the decision, of course there will always be naysayers but for the first time in months I feel there is almost a consensus among Iraqis of all backgrounds. Also Yawar is known to have good relations with Kurds, is trusted by the Shia, is respected by other Arab nations, has a clean record, and belongs to a powerful wealthy well-known Iraqi family that leads the Shimmar tribal confederation, one of the largest tribes in Iraq, with both Sunni and Shi'ite clans, and spanning several neighbouring countries (such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey). That may be a unifying factor and one that Iraqis need badly at this moment of their history. After all the presidency is almost a symbolic title.

The cabinet is impressive. We now have 5 female ministers, which is an unprecedented step in the region. Just as Iraq was the first Arab country to have a female minister in 1958, it is now also the first Arab country to grant a larger role for women in the government. I expect a much larger percentage of women in the future National Assembly or parliament. The majority of ministers are independent politically, they are mostly technocrats, and come from all Iraqi social, ethnic, religious, and sectarian backgrounds. Many old players are absent such as Chalabi's INC. Also another interesting observation is that four of the ministers are also tribal figures.

So, perhaps I'm a bit optimistic today? Maybe. But Iraqis need to be optimistic at such a critical moment.

Five days ago I suspected that the Iraqis, possibly with help from the Bush administration, succeeding in defying all low expectations by shaking the reins of the United Nations and assembling a meticulously pluralist government with a month's time to spare. Columnist David Warren came to a similar conclusion (via Donald Sensing). All at once, the left's favorite canards — that no acceptable interim government would be in place to accept a handover of power, and that Bush was deferring heavily to the United Nations — have evaporated. That robs them, for the moment, of initiative to continue spreading doubt. As for the Iraqis, reaction to their government's appointees is quite normal in its dynamics ("He's brilliant!" "He's a bum!") and, as Zeyad believes, will only improve as officers and ministers prove themselves. What's not to celebrate now, and be hopeful of in days to come? Don't ask Williams, who would rather snub Iraqis for the consistency of his politics. Ask the Iraqis who recognize the opportunity of a lifetime.

It's Pavlovian, and in no flattering way: Iraqis take a tremendous leap forward by electing much of their formal interim government themselves, and terrorists detonate car bombs. The men trying to prevent liberal sovereignty in Iraq have motives so base, so animalistic that their fear of democracy could be nothing less than their inability to compete with it.

HOW DEVILS WORK: Wretchard at Belmont Club writes his own Screwtape Letter, only his demons are corporeal and we read an Islamofascist Wormwood's dispatches to, rather than from, his assumed uncle. I often wonder how many of our enemies have twisted sense enough to look further than their next act of slaughter and torment; one risks giving the strongman too much credit by gilding what is really a modern variation on the simple desire to consume others. But Wretchard reminds us that evil men, for whatever superficial motive, seek our destruction and work daily towards its accomplishment.

Former EOD man Blaster has been following reports on the sarin shell since its discovery two weeks ago. About to conclude the investigative trail led nowhere, Blaster overheard a CNN interview with current Iraqi Survey Group head Charles Duelfer last Wednesday. Later that day, Blaster found a press release from the ISG. Bottom line: the shell is pre-1991, probably constructed around 1988 when Iraq is believed to have begun field tests of binary sarin shells. The armament was not destroyed by UNSCOM, nor did Saddam declare its destruction. And the shell's origin could very well have been an existing stockpile.

The Chicago Tribune's Bill Glauber has an excellent report on the ever-more apparent Allied success against Iran-backed thug Muqtada al-Sadr. Our military was smart, deadly, and full of ideas. One commander estimates that al-Sadr's ranks disintegrated from 2,500 in the beginning of April to less than 500 last week. And as in Fallujah, troops were quick to rebuild and recruit, in one case setting some of the louts they'd been fighting days before to work on repairing an amusement park. On-the-spot forgiveness isn't for everyone — certainly not hard-boiled street trash or murderous cranks like al-Sadr — but it appears that for some, simply the assertion of American power is motivation enough:

Al-Sadr finally relented and agreed to negotiate after U.S. forces captured his key aide and brother-in-law, Riyadh al-Nouri, early Wednesday.

Apparently, al-Nouri was relieved.

"He said, `First of all, thank you for capturing me not killing me,'" Dempsey said.

"`Thank you for treating me as well as you are, and thirdly, I'm really glad this is over.'"

With luck, his sentiment is a popular one. A most prominent enemy of Iraq nearly convinced the Allies of failure that wasn't; now we can see al-Sadr's folly in directly challenging the United States military. Though crushing the Khomeinist insurgency isn't complete, we should no longer question Iraqi solidarity against violent disruption of their new way of life — or the power of American resolve when it remains sturdy and steady. As always, only doubt separates our forces from eventual victory.

SADR WON'T GO QUIETLY: The military may be able to peel off those in Sadr's ranks who Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt described to as "wayward youths that were somehow convinced, corrupted, connived by persons such as Muqtada al-Sadr into picking up weapons against the coalition and against their fellow Iraqis." For the rest, only the application of force seems to make any difference.

BACK TO THE NARRATIVE: Allied officials have gone out of their way to make clear that the "halt in offensive operations" in the south of Iraq is just that, negotiated by Iraqi leaders and tolerated only long enough to see if al-Sadr will live up to his agreement. The press has incorrectly billed this as a ceasefire or truce, all the better to prepare for a headline exclaiming its failure.