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Gnats Michael Ubaldi, December 22, 2004.
Recent attacks committed by terrorists against Iraqis and Allies clearly indicate only two things: one, that organized killers are in Iraqi cities and two, that they will take murder any way that it comes. Those who fell while mourning in the south and eating lunch in the north did so in relatively large numbers; and the mess hall attack in Mosul has by numerical measurement earned itself the title of, to paraphrase, "the most deadly single attack on American troops since the beginning of the war." In headlines, these combined body counts are dispiriting to supporters of Iraqi freedom and useful for naysayers and assorted Fifth Columns. As Wretchard notes today and I have been repeating, this is asymmetrical warfare up front: give stateless authoritarians physical access to an open society and they will nestle in to carry out random horrors in the hopes of destroying the trust, honor and common good of free men from the inside out, with the intention of dominating them when suitably weakened. That, and nothing else, is what evil drives a strongman to do. But neither attack demonstrates any newfound or troubling strength on the part of the enemy. Just a handful of terrorists were necessary for each act and neither was followed by additional strikes to press advantage. The Near Eastern funeral procession is by definition a mass of people; situate a single powerful explosive anywhere near it and the death rate is high. It's not at all the same thing as a large number of coinciding deaths of empowered, well-protected individuals in Iraqi or Allied political and military ranks. Back in the summer and fall, we would read daily reports of Baghdad citizens cut down by a mortar shell, the equivalent of four gang members running around New York City near rush hour firing rockets in every direction. They were painful personally and to a lesser extent politically but an expression of the terrorists' strategic weakness: not feracious, just feral. John Allen Mohammed and Lee Boyd Malvo frightened the Beltway with their killing spree but did nothing to shake the foundations of the free states of Maryland and Virginia, nor that of the District of Columbia. In Iraq, a country barely two years from an unbroken history of compulsory rule, with a population that for thirty years learned like good victims of Stalinism to look the other way, and a fledgling police force that often must beg for the public common good taken for granted in the established free world, clandestine butchers will get away with a good deal more. But for how long? Analysts, including Retired Lt. General Robert Scales who spoke on Special Report with Brit Hume last night, recognize the attack on Task Force Olympia as an incredibly lucky hit — rocket or bomber — both in terms of location and concentration of targets. It came on the heels of no less than six victories by Iraqi police and army forces in Mosul, and provoked what could likely be heavy losses for the terrorists who seem to have chosen the city as the ledge on which to cling. Critics like to make Mosul more than that, but Mosul is not like Fallujah and Fallujah is rebuilding after being thoroughly shaken out. Maybe terrorists will bounce back and forth, says the other side. Maybe, but with markedly fewer every time, having done nothing to prevent increasing stability in three-quarters of Iraq nor the country's first free elections. The tactic of hit-and-run enjoys more romance than it deserves. A favorite of an inferior force — and the away-stands crowd for America's enemies — hit-and-run's purpose is defeated if it invites the destruction of that force, especially if the force tries to hide amongst people who only tolerate its presence out of a fear that slowly ebbs. Pricking a giant enough will leave you in no condition to noticeably bother anybody. Ask the Taliban and Muqtada al-Sadr. See more: Iraq's EmancipationIraq's Emancipation |
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