Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is a man whose respect from the West has been well-earned; his devotion to the apolitical, moderate Shiite Islam and popularity thereof already presents a potent challenge to Iranian fundamentalists. But Sistani's appeal to Muqtada al-Sadr's humanity, almost Gandhi-like in its apparent naivety, has met a predictable response before "negotiations" could even begin:

At least 10 supporters of Iraq's top Shi'ite cleric were shot dead in Najaf Thursday when gunmen opened fire at police who were trying to control the crowd, prompting the police to return fire, witnesses said.

"Suddenly armed men joined our group and fired at the police. The police started firing everywhere," [witness Hazim] Kareem, who was wounded, told Reuters at the hospital, where bodies dripping with blood were piled on stretchers.

Reach out your hand to evil men and they'll cut it off. Who needed a reminder? Knowing Prime Minister Iyad Allawi set a limit to the time operations will be suspended, we're left to the hypothesis that Iraq will wait until it's good and ready to crush foreign and Ba'athist attempts at subversion. The wait again proves to be frustrating — and on a small scale, deadly.

SAVED BY THE BY-LINE: Checking afternoon headlines, I noticed with a start one that read "Sistani Calls on Iraqis to Expel US Troops." Then I realized that this "news" was coming from Granma International, Cuba's state-run press appendage. Maybe next time, Fidel.

CLARITY: Bloomberg Media gives us an idea of what's gone on since Sistani entered Najaf. The "peace deal" brokered by Sistani is a slight variation on every other compromise made between Baghdad authorities and the Khomeinist agent: if the Mahdi gangs disarm and disperse, American troops will leave the job of keeping order to the rightful Iraqis. It certainly won't end the Iranian threat, but could again fit into the "stall" theory. As before, I'd prefer directness and an end to insurgents — but I defer to those with a fuller picture. Muqtada al-Sadr's ranks have been drained again; though al-Sadr is sure to challenge authority again, the political damage done to his counterculture appeal is showing. Every exchange with al-Sadr has strengthened Iraqi solidarity against criminal and terrorist activity, and increased the severity of Allied-Iraqi response — while visibly weakening the upstart's pulpit. Remember, obstacles to putting the so-called "Iraqi face" on things have previously included an unsteady will to fight: the mounting frustration of Iraqi democrats at al-Sadr's perpetuation should neither be underestimated nor assumed detrimental.