Mercy has kept the recent Coalition Provisional Authority poll in its place: a snapshot of opinions taken from a fraction of a country's population that may or may not serve as a key to understanding the entire country, only when considered alongside other surveys. It is at least the fourth major poll to be taken of and, in part, by Iraqis. This time the results are being reported as "grim," a remark borrowed from a diplomat, though it's unclear how some of the more murky opinions of the Average Iraqi Joe differ from previous polls — or are at all inconsistent with a people having lived without Saddam reading over their shoulders for barely a year, and having lived not a day without authoritarian interests from all around doing their worst with drive-bys and car bombs.

In [August] of last year, Karl Zinmeister and the American Enterprise Institute worked with Zogby International to poll Iraqis. What did they find in Iraqis? Optimism — for years ahead. Confusion about democracy, notwithstanding an intense curiosity. Iraqis disliked Islamism, al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. They didn't care for occupation but were no fools about what separated them from murderous hoodlums with eyes peering out from behind pillowcases and scarves.

In [February], after the capture of Saddam Hussein and a steady decline in terrorist violence, Oxford International set about polling and discovered essentially the same opinions. Special to this survey was a separation of opinions into demographics: Iraqi Kurds having spent ten, not just one, years under American protection were overwhelmingly supportive and deferential amid postwar difficulties. Sunnis and Shiites were once again torn between "humiliation" and "liberation," between the Arabist nonsense they'd been fed for decades and the strange thing called "freedom" people were ending up dead over. What is this freedom, many must have wondered. That three-quarters of the 2,000 polled Iraqis saw joining a political party or peacefully demonstrating just as likely a proposition as using violence tells us two things: First, one year of gradual improvement laced with wraiths from the past does nothing to wash away years of totalitarian culture, and it's absurd to think otherwise. Second, if demonstrations are not yet within the courage of most Iraqis, who are those men whipping themselves with chains, portraits of al-Sadr held high? Surely not a representative group.

Confidence in foreign forces was low: 39%, 28% and 25% for the now-defunct Governing Council, the CPA and Anglo-American forces, respectively. But 77% said they'd never actually interacted with soldiers, and Iraqis still weren't ready to see foreigners go. And most striking was the grudging happiness: nearly three-quarters of Iraqis were pleased with their lives, difficulties notwithstanding, and just as many looked to better — not similar or worse — times in the future.

One month later, Gallup released a large-sample survey that underscored and extended Oxford's conclusions. No Kurd in his right mind wanted to return to the Saddamite nightmare; Sunnis and Shiites weren't happy with the occupation, but they weren't crazy, either. As in March, Kurdish autonomy better equipped them for early-democratization hardships. Arabs were sternly critical of the CPA but had nothing to complain about in terms of an improved quality of life. Near East pride reared its head as most Arabs felt occupied while Kurds felt liberated. But virtually no one believed that they would be candidly expressing opinions to Gallup for a global audience had the Allies not deposed Saddam Hussein. And once again, about one out of twenty Arabs had ever met the soldiers their majority condemned.

The latest poll, taken towards the end of the Khomeinist-Ba'athist offensive, picks up where the three before it left off. Iraqis' faith in the Coalition Provisional Authority is still scant (which could be, in a light-hearted way, a good portent for the future of Iraqi libertarians). Respondents call their circumstance occupation.

Two results seem to be misunderstood by the Washington Times report I quote. An increase in positive opinion for Muqtada al-Sadr is billed as troubling, as is the conviction that his disastrous insurrection helped to unify the country. Is this so bad? There's another response the report offered, billing al-Sadr as less popular for executive power than Saddam Hussein himself. Can't we put this together? Muqtada al-Sadr, from the Iraqi perspective, has at least temporarily laid down his arms and sent his merry band of street vermin home. While his gangs were wiped out by Allied forces, his political defeat has come largely from Shiite religious and secular forces joining against him — "join" a synonym of "unify." A shared threat to Iraq's toddler-wobbly common good brought people together for purposeful action. One could similarly say actions of Osama bin Laden helped to unify America, and then misinterpret negatively.

Is there anything wrong with Iraqis? Or the occupation? No — democratization, we've learned, is a wonderful but bittersweet thing, Iraq's made no easier by its terror-culture neighbors. In Tokyo, Douglas MacArthur could always rely on the Japanese public to support his most sweeping reforms when conservatives in the Diet refused to budge. But the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers was running an occupation, after all, and it was not easy or quick or especially appreciated by the Japanese people, despite their fascination with all things Western. Extremism abounded in those first years as much of the population lived in a want and insecurity like that of Iraq. The last effective day of occupation, April 28, 1952, was ordinary and unspecial; simply the formal end to a state out of which the country had finally grown.

One year ago I wrote about parallels between the two American occupations, and where the limits of our influence cross with a real responsibility for Iraqis to use pride, humility, trust and autonomy, each at the right moments. It's no small task, and as Wretchard warned yesterday there will be no CPA to blame. Here is part of what I wrote:

[T]he troubles of post-war Japan must not be taken lightly: suffering and confusion of the Iraq people will be at once unique in its aesthetics (the evil of regionally cultural anarchists and terrorists) and universal in its effect (potential [paralysis]). The country will most likely remain dangerously uncertain of its course and worth for some time. But, second, and more encouraging, is the record of Japan's transcendence. While all nations walk in their own Valley of the Shadow of Death, every one is capable of defeating their worst imperfections.

The Allies will be a source of endless logistics and guidance, if only those resources can be utilized by Iraqis. To this, all that is needed is patience and perseverance and faith.

President Bush has said many times that Iraqis have "a friend in America." Unless domestic politics shift to the party and classes of representation that feel no great urge to fight terror and dictatorship, to talk about freedom but whine when it doesn't come gift-wrapped, that friendship will remain strong; the "logistics and guidance" will continue no matter how poorly we are initially or ultimately received, or if our intentions are misunderstood. Friendship stands even when buffeted, lousy poll or not. There is more to all of this than brownouts and lurking terror. The Kurds can and should encourage their reluctant Arab countrymen of that.