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The King, Refused
 
Michael Ubaldi, June 9, 2004.
 

One month ago, in praising Allied accomplishments in Iraq, I noted the unresolved nature of Fallujah:

As the Marine Corps made clear in Fallujah, insurgents were utterly outmatched and their position in the Golan neighborhood stood at the mercy of an American initiative. Whatever reprieve the Ba'athists gained after days of heavy losses began — and thus can end — at our forces' choosing.


The Marines are to be congratulated, having averted what from all accounts was an inevitable high-casualty showdown in that northwest Golan neighborhood. Since then they have been making generous overtures to the people and moderate political leadership inside the city, recognizing the indefinition between heartfelt support for Saddam Hussein and Arabist rule-of-the-strong and forced exclamations of allegience by a terrified populace in a long-troubled city.

The military's previously light-handed treatment of Fallujah worked to deny them initiative and political encouragement they enjoyed from an overwhelming majority of Iraqis for the demolition of southern Khomeinist insurgent Muqtada al-Sadr. For a month, the American-led occupation publicly provided the violent men of Fallujah an opportunity for relative clemency and an invitation to join the new Iraq. The outstretched hand has been knocked away:

Reports say that insurgents today launched mortar attacks against Iraqi security forces in the town of Al-Fallujah, reportedly causing casualties. Details are still sketchy. Earlier reports said that U.S. tanks were gathering outside the town.


If true, a military buildup and eventual killing blow — the one intended for weeks ago — is altogether appropriate and necessary. For over thirty days, for the whole of Iraq and the world to see, the Ba'athist-Syrian-terrorist combine was given a chance. Could we have expected hardened criminals and murderous fanatics, "souped up on jihad," to act like civilized men? Hardly. The Marines knew who would join and who would humor. But the case for a warrant has been built, if not to convince the skeptics and terror sympathists, than to discredit them; and to reassure that Iraqi people that their past — and premonition of failure — lies in the black hearts of Fallujah. As with al-Sadr, the Allies have their answer, and must choose to end the reprieve here and now.