I've been an early and consistent opponent of those who believe violence in Iraq to be a product of Iraqi immaturity or savagery, that Iraqis would eventually embrace incessant intimidation, destruction and murder — or simply capitulate, forever slaves to tyranny. When the Khomeinist-Ba'athist offensive began in April I wondered, after initial responses from Americans clearly showed the insurgent's inferiority in the military and political contest they had entered, if a fatal strategic mistake had been made; that the enemy shared by Iraqis and Westerners struck too soon, overconfident, and would not only fail to incite panic and chaos but help to unite Iraqis in a newfound common good against strongmen. If this mistake could only be exploited, much could be gained for the country's security and stability. In southern Iraq, that coalescence may have begun:

Representatives of Iraq's most influential Shiite leaders met here on Tuesday and demanded that Moktada al-Sadr, a rebel Shiite cleric, withdraw militia units from the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, stop turning the mosques there into weapons arsenals and return power to Iraqi police and civil defense units that operate under American control.

...Several Shiite leaders acknowledged that they had delayed issuing their statement until there were clear signs that public opinion among Shiites had moved strongly against Mr. Sadr. Reports in the past two weeks have spoken of a shadowy death squad calling itself the Thulfiqar Army shooting dead at least seven of Mr. Sadr's militiamen in Najaf, and several thousand people attended an anti-Sadr protest meeting outside the Imam Ali shrine in the city on Friday, according to several of the meeting's participants.

This could be a powerful vindication for the reputation of Iraqis who seem to have caught much of the blame for the actions of a few — a divorced, irreconcilable few who are the forces from whom the Allies liberated Iraq and seek to liberate the Near East.