Michael Ubaldi, March 9, 2004.
I've been following and opining on Iraq's progress towards self-rule for months, with occasional philosophical observations about Shiite leader Ayatollah al-Sistani. But who better to ask for a close look at the situation than a well-educated, progressive, brutally honest Iraqi? I e-mailed Zeyad of Healing Iraq over the weekend, asking what he thought about the politics Shiite demands placed on the Governing Council and the demands themselves, most notably the provision made for Islam. He responded yesterday:
As to the Shi'ite demands of giving a larger role to Islam in the interim constitution: It's a very worrying development, and many other secular Iraqis share [my] concern. I mean if they are only too eager to add this in the transitional law, what would happen when the time comes to write a permanent constitution?
The statement that 'no future legislation should contradict Islamic Shari'a law' is a very broad one, and as you know Shari'a is interpreted differently by different Islamic sects and even between different clerics in one sect. However, I have hope that moderate Iraqi groups and parties would stand against such a proposition (as they did with the infamous Resolution 137). Only time can tell, and things don't look clear at the moment.
Afghanistan's constitution contains a similar clause requiring a reflection of Islam in legislation. Purists worry about church intertwined with state, but I have felt fairly confident that even a mildly progressive judiciary will defer to the more prominent provisions for equity and equality in each country's constitution, allowing individual rights to trump the long arm of Sharia and theocracy. As Zeyad noted, the success of a public backlash to Resolution 137 is proof enough that liberal politics carry sway in Iraq. But his last remark - that the fate of secular governance is by no means certain - can't be taken lightly. Before it dissolves, the Provisional Authority must ensure that neither secular nor religious authoritarianism has even the slightest chance of swallowing up the country's nascent free society. Accommodating sectarian religious interests here and there may facilitate politics right now. Indeed, the larger cultural trend - apparent in Iraq and Afghanistan - is one where the rule of law cannot forthwith disconnect religion, and those societies may require a generation or more to make a distinction between dogma and natural law. But for any hope of progress, liberal secularists will need the upper hand when Iraq assumes sovereignty.