Quote of the day:

I must say, I actually think what we learned during the inspections made Iraq a more dangerous place potentially than in fact we thought it was even before the war.

That, ladies and gentlemen, is former head of the Allies' weapons hunter in Iraq, David Kay, interviewed by National Public Radio reporter Liane Hansen. Justin Katz's observations on Kay's statements (via IP) are thoughtful, serving in part as indictments of the mass media's generally shallow reporting (including Fox). He reminds us of the primary reasons for war - before the negotiation, beyond the narrow scope that the Security Council accepted. He has a point. Several months after the prewar diplomacy has been muddled by politics, a refreshment is in order.

The direct threat Ba'athist Iraq posed to America was its very nature: a police state brutally run by Saddam Hussein, who had for two decades demonstrated his insatiable desire for strife and conquest. For twelve years after his Gulf War defeat he refused to relinquish his reported and clandestine weapons institutions - a concession we now know, with Moammar Ghadafi's capitulation, is neither impossible nor a geopolitical suicide pact, in fact quite the opposite - and so in this regard alone, drew up his own warrant. (If not, what would any international agreement ever be worth?)

Saddam Hussein (and many other dictators) might have been left undisturbed had September 11th not brought the potential of the Near East's culture of hatred and violence to the world's attention. Named as part of the Axis of Evil, the Ba'athist regime would need to be destroyed for two reasons, each reinforcing the other.

Iraq's relative power and hostile orientation towards most of the West made it an advocate and guardian of the region's oppressive status quo - and a perpetual 800-pound gorilla to frustrate attempts at democratization. If newly liberated countries, protected by Western armies, were to have any hope of removing the appeal of Islamism through modernization, Saddam Hussein's deposition was a critical first step.

Second, until Saddam and his regime fell, Iraq's known and alleged weapons were far too great a risk to be left unaccounted for. Saddam, who used chemical weapons and hired terrorists without hesitation against his enemies - and earnestly adopted Islamist rhetoric, insignia and associations after being driven from Kuwait in 1991 - had little reason not to regard terrorist groups as the perfect asymmetrical weapon. Iraq would provide resources, the terrorists would attack their shared enemies. Each party brought its own collateral. If Saddam mistreated the terrorists, they might undermine his rule; if terrorists set upon Iraq without provocation, they could lose the wealth of a state while gaining an enemy. Unconvincing? It shouldn't be. Consider Saudi Arabia's Faustian bargain with al Qaeda, the racketeering of an entire state. Was such an alliance between Saddam and terrorists well-established? Loose and tentative? Or perhaps nonexistent? State sponsorship of terrorism is practically a tradition in Iran and Syria. Ultimately, the possibility existed in Iraq and was far too dangerous to ignore.

The United States led a coalition into Iraq as much for weapons of mass destruction as the tyrannical regime that would own them. Success could only come from elimination of both weapons and owners. If Ba'athist Iraq had, like Libya, opened itself up to scrutiny, Saddam may have won both sympathy and amnesty from an amoral United Nations; the matter of freeing the Near East - and stamping out terrorism - could have been postponed indefinitely. After September 11th, this was unacceptable. It's wrongheaded to believe that a strongman wouldn't empower himself in every way possible; but Libya is not a top strategic priority today, and if Ghadafi can be taken nicely as he is taken slowly, so be it. As events played out, Saddam's WMD pursuit went hand-in-hand with his horrific example of authoritarianism. The latter has been demolished and with it went any possibility, however in doubt, for the former. And the former, as David Kay made clear, carried far more potential for catastrophe than we ever imagined.