Today's lead editorial in the Wall Street Journal is primarily concerned with Kofi Annan's preference for internationalism over the liberal sovereignty, but an interesting perspective on the recent Turkish occupation agreement is truly worth noting:

[T]he Europeans were never going to help much anyway, and Turkey's parliament has already voted overwhelmingly to send a force. What's more, Turkey wants to help out in the dangerous Sunni triangle, where it's really needed. A (largely Sunni) Muslim democracy with a sterling peacekeeping record and real military strength, Turkey was far and away the most important ally the U.S. could have hoped for.

We're disappointed that Turkey's decision has been met with threats from some Kurds and cries of "sell-out" from some of their American supporters. Turkey was an indispensable protector of the Northern Iraqi Kurdish safe haven for more than a decade, providing it with a vital trade link to the outside world and with the air bases to support Operation Northern Watch.

Some of the ideas being mooted to soothe Kurdish sensibilities - such as moving Turkish troops by air or sea - would justifiably be considered an affront by the Turks, who are putting themselves very much in harm's way. If Washington is going to turn the Turkish parliamentary vote into an actual deployment, it is going to have to talk bluntly with Kurdish leaders Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani.

Is successful diplomacy often dependent on a certain sensitivity to culture and mores? Of course. But tiptoeing around every strategic matter insofar as every decision made is a timid one - whatever Baby Boomer, "Don't offend anybody or else they'll hate us forever and ever" guiding principle prevailing in the political class today - will not serve the world's interests in the long run.

While this is anecdotal (and linkless), I'd read somewhere that the Marines and Army differed in both their approach to postwar security and effectiveness thereof. The Army, it seems, adopted a low profile and patrolled with relatively non-confrontational postures. The Marines, in contrast, would not move about without weapons or the obvious show of tactical power; they were civil, but extremely no nonsense. According to the article, Iraqis and troublemakers learned quickly - in both instances. The Army was less successful in maintaining order and morale was lower than the Marines, who were far more successful in keeping the streets safe.

Every national population feels a combination of resentment and humiliation to acknowledge their inability to build a free society alone; major occupations in the past like Japan and Germany constantly met indigenous resistance to and haggling with directives and reconstruction undertakings. The key was to balance conciliation with dictation; never to show a weakness of resolve.

I'm generally in disagreement with the call for more troops in Iraq (which, thankfully, has died down with revelations of a reconstruction far more successful than reported). The problem lies at the source of foreign fighters complicating the battle with Ba'ath loyalists, which, if to be solved by military deployments, would take place in those countries, and not Iraq. Eschewing help from a powerfully secular democracy like Turkey, then, should be on strategic grounds - not for the sake of Kurdish self-esteem.