A problem with various detractors of the Bush administration's command is that their collective argument focuses on the wrong aspects of the war. Reconstruction and defense in Iraq and Afghanistan, while in many ways at the mercy of unrest and disorder committed by adversarial forces, will ultimately operate on their own timetables. Infrastructure can be built more quickly with greater resources - but civil society cannot. A decade needed to right the Iraqi national conscience is not unreasonable. Afghanistan will take longer. To connect exterior threats with a failure on the Allied occupations' part is erroneous.

While turning on a country like Pakistan is currently a political impossibility, Iran and Syria, by their dedicated support of the very terrorist groups attempting to destablize Allied progress in the region, should be the Near East front's next candidates for regime change. Questions of the White House's strategic outlook are warranted here. From Saul Singer:

Just as the U.S. cannot afford to lose in Iraq, it cannot afford to exempt Iran and Syria from the Bush Doctrine: Supporting terror is punishable by regime change. If the terrorist network senses that the Iraq war was the end, rather than a cardinal demonstration of, the war against it, it is a matter of time before terrorist attacks against the West multiply in size and number.

Let's say the U.S. realizes this, but is still not ready to target other regimes. Such reticence is understandable, however unwise. Yet it is no excuse for a false, all-or-nothing dichotomy. Who says that just because the U.S. does not want to invade or immediately seek the overthrow of the Iranian and Syrian regimes that there is nothing to be done?

...much more could be done. Topping the list should be to unmask the abominable human-rights record of the Iranian regime. Iran holds thousands of political prisoners and brutally represses dissent, yet is not thought of as human-rights abuser in the league of Saddam Hussein, Burma, or even China. True, Iran did not make Freedom House's 2003 list of World's Most Repressive Regimes, but it came close: a rating of 6 for lack of political and civil rights, where 7 is the bottom of the barrel.

...Syria, on the other hand, is on the list of most repressive regimes. The Freedom House report explains that a brief easing dubbed "Damascus Spring" reached its zenith in January 2001 when 1,000 Syrian intellectuals called for comprehensive political reforms. By the end of that year new restrictions were imposed and 10 leading reformists were arrested. In 2002, the "Damascus Ten" were sentenced to prison and over a dozen prominent journalists and human-rights activists were arrested.

The problem with Singer's argument - one that affects most critiques of the administration - is that he ends with no clear alternative, merely resting on the belief that "Something is better than nothing":

All of this can be done even if the U.S. does not have a clear idea as to how the Iranian and Syrian regimes will ultimately fall. A plan for regime change is best, but a minimal alternative is to follow the simple blueprint these two enemies are using: The more problems we make for the other side, the less trouble they can make for us. Incrementalism is not ideal, but in this case, far superior to the combination of bluster and inaction.

Is it (and is "nothing" the only alternative)? American reconstruction in both Afghanistan and Iraq is derided for poor pre-planning and blurry long-term objectives. I would argue against this: far-reaching plans are of marginal worth at best when tactical circumstances present themselves, resulting in unexpected setbacks and a jagged road to success. The Bush administration could have leapt into Saddam's corner; but they didn't, and that serves as evidence to significant planning for Saddam's deposition and its consequences. And no, neither country is in as historically terrible shape as skeptics would have us believe. Moreover, many of the same people whispering aloud at Bush's determined pursuit of a New World Order turn around and serve up shibboleths of aimlessness. As with any double-sided partisan attack: which will it be?

Now suppose for a minute, whether you trust Bush or not, that the White House would be engaging Syria and Iran without even a semblance of a complete strategy. How much would that really accomplish for public trust at home or military victory abroad? And what would little pricks and prods amount to - remember, we did the very same thing to Saddam for a decade, with few results. Israel slaps Arafat and his thugs about week after week, but deprived of complete military victory, the Jews can't escape from a terrorist water torture.

Should we take Iran and Syria to task? By all means: they are prime instigators of terrorism and antagonists of liberty in the region. Steven Den Beste offers advice on cleaning out the State Department's penchant for the kind of indecision Saul Singer and others are worried about.

My fear is that too many critics aren't prepared to follow the logical response to their complaints: more regime change. Much more.