As the Oxblog-Tacitus argument continues, I noticed that today's list of violent incidents occurring in Shiite locations might be a bit of an overstatement on Tacitus' behalf.

Particularly with today's reiteration of a simple, nonideological criminal element in Iraq, we can't consider deaths in a Shiite town to be proof positive of Shiite resistance or the kind of organized violence that the Allies should consider a political failure or of internal origination.

I've read through the articles of ambushes in Shiite cities and towns, and with all but one, haven't come across any distinct identity of assailants.

It's no surprise or secret that people in Basra are frustrated; any disrupted urban environment with an accommodating authority (i.e., one that won't round up malcontents and yank out their eyeteeth) is ripe for protest. Two weeks ago, a small number of residents rioted. But even in those accounts, it's unclear as to whether the weapons attacks were necessarily part of a Shiite resistance. Considering criminals or an Iranian/Saudi/etcetera jihadist element simply taking advantage of unrest is important to deciding whether this is really "resistance" or external threats to security that are quite independent of the people who matter most to this argument - law-abiding, Iraqi citizens.

So this may not be about extra-triangle resistance. Even the ostensibly popularly contrived murder of British MPs in Majar al-Kabir seems a little fishy, what with a distinct Iranian presence onsite. We're really talking about invasion - a contingency that was not only predicted from day one, but is perceived under the developing "flypaper" ethos to be a potential bonding agent between Iraqis and Allied troops, even through the worst of times.

Everyone knew the Near East, while capitulating in some respects, would initially throw its dictatorial weight into defeating a free Iraq. The worst possible reaction to the continuing disarray is pessimism and expectations of disaster.