Reuel Marc Gerecht echoes my sentiments against any political participation (read: meddling) in Iraq from amoral Old Europe or yet-totalitarian Near East regimes:

Irrespective of whether we should seek to have Europeans, Pakistanis, or Indians dying with or in lieu of Americans, irrespective of whether murderous hard-core Baathists and Sunni fundamentalists would feel less "occupied" and less murderous seeing Turks in their country, and irrespective of whether the economically stressed, antiwar countries of the European Union would actually give meaningful financial aid to Iraq, the idea of a "new coalition" to oversee the reconstruction of Iraq is entirely unwise. It would probably encourage the worst political and cultural tendencies among Iraqis, even among those who are profoundly pro-Western. It could easily send a signal throughout the Middle East and beyond that the Bush administration doesn't have the stomach to transform Iraq, let alone the region.

In the Muslim Middle East, in the age of bin Ladenism, where the rulers and the ruled are constantly assessing American strength and purpose, multilateralism, when it is so evidently cover for a lack of patience and fortitude, is never a virtue. However long the United States stays in Iraq, the cost in American lives and dollars will likely go up, not down, the more we "internationalize" the occupation. The men who are killing U.S. soldiers, and other foreigners, want to drive the United States and other Westerners out of the country. When Washington talks about the need to share the pain, what these men hear is that America wants to run. And however commendable may be the idea of a joint American-European project in the Middle East through which we can lessen the rancor between us, greater European participation in Iraq's reconstruction is much more likely to fray U.S.-European relations than enhance them. It will be hard to blame the Iraqis for the ensuing troubles. It's not their fault if Washington doesn't read Islamic history.

Do foreign policy moderates like Senators Joe Biden and Chuck Hagel, who support a vague measure of "internationalization," truly believe in the idea of blunting reconstruction command? I suspect they don't, but want auxiliaries onto to which one could shunt blame in the event of an ugly situation in the future - yet all at the expense of American adminstration. Democrats to the left of fellow party member Biden and Republican Hagel, from their own statements, are probably more interested in obviating Near East reform altogether. But whatever the specifics, as Gerecht explains, the broad multilateral drive is motivated by having no stomach for reconstruction in Iraq - or anywhere else. While disturbing as a potential policy and distracting as a component in Washington's debate (arguing over whether or not to lead reconstruction in Iraq as opposed to how to go about it), this challenge may be more useful than damaging. Gerecht is correct in drawing attention to this danger; in practicality, this is good news for Bush. The president's actions show a reliable pattern of resistance to wavering from American prerogative; his decisions on foreign affairs are usually immune to the latest trend in focus-group diplomacy. The general electorate speaks similarly through consistent polling.

The same brand of "world opinion" that came to Saddam Hussein's public defense has hit an all-time floor in value, its principal manufacturers in no shape to distribute. France shrieked its voice raw in the first months of the year with no signs of recovering; Near East dictatorships are tiptoeing around Washington while quietly dealing with murmurs of reform or rebellion in their own states; Germany is reentering Washington's good graces only by way of obsequious concession. No one cares what the Belgians have to say. The domestic game is tilted even further: with Democrats united in an unpopular appeal to subcontract the United States out of leading the war on terror, the White House has been given another powerful campaign issue by its opponents.