Preppy ponders the long-term significance of the Baghdad Boys' bullet-ridden ticket to Hell.

Here's my deduction: Saddam is dead, and has been since the beginning of the war. Ba'athists, supported to a significant extent by the Hussein brothers, primarily Qusai, have been perpetuating Saddam like a brand name. A twisted Betty Crocker or Ronald McDonald comes to mind: as long as the specter of Saddam survives, fear among the populace remains. The sons, never diabolical impresarios like their father, were nevertheless ably powerful political figures and commanders and could muster some semblance of a central authority over the last months.

With yesterday's deaths, the Ba'athist component of disorder in Iraq will be without the venerable bloodline, and should crumble in a month or two. Some members will try to vanish; some will surrender; some may struggle in vain for position on a now-dead hierarchy, perhaps drawing undue attention to themselves; some may take a vertical transfer downward, join the criminal elements of the country's unrest now or else wait for the Iraqi livelihood to stabilize and then try their hand at organized crime.

Foreign terrorists - the "al Qaeda-types" we hear referenced weekly - and the aforementioned jailbird louts have no reason to cease operations beyond a natural, largely temporary reaction of awe and self-preservation brought about by the Allies defeating Hussein's sons. But these particular forces are, according to Allied accounts, with neither substantial organization nor specific, strategic purpose - they're just a Near East subsidiary of Damage, Inc., willing to cause mayhem for a blurry "Jihad" or kicks and grins. Or both.

The occupation must deal with Islamists and overarmed criminals in turn, but I would be confident that the Ba'ath Party will be out of the insurgency business by mid-fall.

A LOOK BACK TO THIS POST FROM MID-FALL, 2003: Ba'athists would "be out of the insurgency business" unless, of course, they joined forces with Islamists and criminals. Even so, reconstruction continues, faster in areas outside the Sunni Triangle but across the country nonetheless. Without a superpower patron, the terror forces inside Iraq will inevitably lose.