Instapundit has a powerful post, itself serving as a nexus for other insights that are comforting in this time of expectation and, often, impatience. It's my understanding that I'm the "usually reliable reader" who sent him some troop numbers, essentially to debunk the poisonous, opportunistic "We need more boots on the ground" shibboleth (yes, the one that, as with the near-altercation yesterday, makes me a bit jumpy). Sadly, the remark has mileage because quite a few people haven't pinned down the numbers - and the reality of the matter - themselves.

I can help.

American forces numbered 430,000 in late 1945; 200,000 in 1946; 120,000 in 1947; 102,000 in 1948. From that point, numbers began to increase in concert with Cold War tensions. After the San Francisco System was agreed upon by Tokyo and Washington, force strength grew to as much as 260,000 in 1951-1952.

Remember, the population of Japan at that time was 70 million. Thus at the height of American military presence, troop saturation was one for every 162 Japanese but quickly fell to one for every 350, then one for every 580; and at the nadir, one for every 685 Japanese.

Iraq, according to the CIA, has a population of 25 million (24 million to be more exact, but I thought I'd be generous to the opposing argument). As Allied forces in Iraq stand now, Central Command has one occupation soldier for every 170 Iraqis.

In other words, the Bush administration would need to recall a bit more than half of its force before matching the per capita level in Occupied Japan. We have twice as many soldiers for democratization than we did in Japan.

At this point, I'd expect a contrarian to point at my argumentative victory and demand that the process move more quickly and smoothly, what with a larger complement of stationed troops. My response? Just wait.